The Friction between CM and Governor

[GS Paper 2 – Indian Polity and Governance]

The signs of friction between the sitting Chief Minister of a State and the Governor is nothing new in Indian states. The onus primarily remains with the Chief Minister to not blow the situation out of proportion and avert any sort of constitutional crisis. The primary reason behind the recent spate of political turmoil between the CM and Governor in many states of India can be attributed to the persons as Governors who have been politically active in the recent past and the partisan role they play as the agents of the Center. 

Constrained by the ‘aid and advice’ clause in their routine functioning, some Governors seem to be using the discretionary space available to them to keep regimes on tenterhooks.  

Related SC Judgements

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down in 1974 that the President and Governor shall “exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well-known exceptional situations” — “situations” also illustrated. Yet, there is the extraordinary situation of some Governors not acting upon requests to grant clemency or assent to Bills; and, in one instance in Tamil Nadu, a reluctance to reserve for the President’s consideration a Bill that expressly requires Presidential assent because of obvious conflict with a central law.

Causes of the Conflict

1. The Constitution fixes no time-frame for the Governors to act, and contains, in Article 163, an unusual power to choose what is in their discretion and what is not, with the courts being barred from inquiring into whether any advice and, if so, what advice was given.

2. Governors indeed have a duty to defend the Constitution and encourage or caution the elected regime, the impression that Governors are not obliged to heed Cabinet advice persists in some areas.

3. There are numerous examples of the Governor’s position being abused, usually at the behest of the ruling party at the Center. The process of appointment has generally been the cause behind it.

4. In several cases, politicians and former bureaucrats identifying with a particular political ideology have been appointed as the Governors by the central government. This goes against the constitutionally mandated neutral seat and has resulted in bias.

5. Governor’s discretionary powers to invite the leader of the largest party/alliance, post-election, to form the government has often been misused to favor a particular political party.

6. A Governor’s recommendation for President’s Rule (Article 356) in a state has not always been based on ‘objective material’, but on political whim or fancy.

Related Recommendations

1. The “Punchhi commission – 2010” recommended that there should be a provision for the impeachment of the governor by the state legislature. The state chief minister should have a say in the governor’s appointment.

2. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Article 356 should be used in very rare cases when it becomes unavoidable to restore the breakdown of constitutional machinery in the State.

3. The Supreme Court in the Nabam Rebia judgment (2016) ruled that the exercise of Governor’s discretion Article 163 is limited and his choice of action should not be arbitrary or fanciful.

Way Forward

At a time when regional political forces are actively seeking to be heard by the Centre, it may be time that the provisions relating to the Governor’s role are amended. Identifying areas of discretion, fixing a time-frame for them to act, and making it explicit that they are obliged to go by Cabinet advice on dealing with Bills can be considered.
In addition, as suggested by the M.M. Punchhi Commission, ending the practice of burdening Governors with the office of Chancellor in universities should also be considered.

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