Image Credit: Reuters
Context
Multi-Domain Deterrence (MDD) is one area where India is quickly changing to counter the PLA of China, with land, air, sea, cyber, and space capabilities. This is changing as a result of the necessity to overcome a technologically advanced enemy, such as building a strong, native Defence-Industrial Base (DIB) and taking advantage of dual-use technology such as AI, drones, and hypersonics. Strategic asymmetry is what India seeks to attain in terms of their military reforms, and the localized manufacturing of systems such as missiles and submarines.
Understanding Multi-Domain Deterrence (MDD)
Multi-domain deterrence is a method that links military and non-military capabilities to project unacceptable costs on an enemy on various fronts at the same time.
- Beyond Traditional Silos: It goes beyond platform-focused, service-oriented warfare to a so-called domain convergence, where satellite, drone, and cyber network intelligence is integrated into one decision-making ecosystem.
- Deterrence by Denial: It is aimed at rendering aggression operationally (e.g., air and cyber denial) and not at punishing an aggressor even after he attacks.
- Fourth Global Domains: In 2025, the joint doctrine of India opened up the scope of operations to include land, sea, air, cyber, space, and the cognitive (information) domains.
The Role of a Strong Defence-Industrial Base (DIB)
A powerful DIB is not merely about production; it is a tactical tool that helps in giving resilience and surge capacity when there are long-term battles.
- Closing the Capability Gap: China has an enormous industrial base that can manufacture thousands of drones and missiles in case of a conflict. India needs to counter this “mass” with a strategy of industrialization that is more focused on missiles, munitions and drone ecosystems.
- Strategic Autonomy: Decreasing reliance on outside suppliers (such as Russia or the West) will make sure that essential platforms and spares are accessible even during sanctions or world sanctions supply chain shocks.
- Surge Capacity: When an enemy knows that India will exhaust its high-tech ammunition in a prolonged battle, deterrence is undermined. A powerful DIB guarantees the possibility to expand the production quickly in the times of war.
Strategic imperatives to India
To build this industrial foundation, several hard policy choices and reforms are necessary:
- Integrated Capability Building: Undergoing service-specific procurement to enablers such as C4ISR ( Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) which are cross-branch enablers.
- The Privatisation of Sector: The abandonment of excessive dependence on Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) in favor of the dynamism of the private sector and startups via programmes such as iDEX and Positive Indigenisation Lists.
- Doctrinal Convergence: Structural changes such as Theatre Commands should be based on a common military doctrine so that technology and output of industry can be geared towards the manner in which the forces intend to fight.
Systemic Problems and Obstacles
- Inventory Gap: The imbalance between the missile inventories and missile production between India and China is still a decisive risk.
- Procurement Bottlenecks: Procurement delays and absence of long term budget stability tend to put off privately funded high-end of defense R&D.
- Technological Lag: India continues to depend on imported items of the vital “exquisite” items such as jet engines and sophisticated microelectronics.
Conclusion
The credibility of deterrence by India in the age of non-contact and intelligentised war is no longer pegged on the amount of boots on the ground but on the level of Indian infested industrial capability and technological readiness. The only way to offset the military advantage held by China is to have a strong defence-industrial base that will offer national resilience in the long run.
Source: The Hindu
.png)
